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Seafood futures contracts are a novelty in the derivative markets, having shrimp as their only
exponent. Unfortunately, shrimp futures contracts have suffered a disappointing start. The
analyses focus on testing whether premiums/discounts for non-par deliverable shrimp size
categories can eliminate cash price differentials, and whether the shrimp futures market can
predict cash prices without bias. Results indicate ineffective premiums/discounts and
predictive bias. These results and the momentous changes taking place in the seafood industry
are contrasted to discuss the viability of seafood futures contracts.
The only seafood commodities currently traded in
futures markets are frozen white and black tiger
shrimps. The white shrimp contract trading opened
in 1993, while the black tiger shrimp contract was
introduced in 1994. These two contracts, on the
Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE), have failed
to attract the expected trade volume based on the
underlying shrimp cash market flow. This has cast
doubt regarding the potential of seafood products
as a feasible underlying commodity for trade in
futures markets. In this paper, we try to determine
whether the premiums/discounts associated with
non-par deliverable shrimp categories are able to
eliminate the price differentials in their respective
cash markets. The paper also focuses on the pre-
dictive ability of futures prices to forecast the spot
prices of the various deliverable size categories.
This is important because the effectiveness of fu-
tures markets in hedging risk is partly dependent
on these issues. If futures markets are inefficient in
the sense that they do not incorporate all relevant
information and are biased predictors of spot
prices, they will introduce extra cost to hedgers,
namely the market failure cost (Antoniou and Fos-
ter 1994). We suggest that if poor contract design
is to blame for the failure of shrimp futures con-
tracts, seafood commodities, in general, could still
be viable commodities for futures trading. In fact,
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recent developments in trading mechanisms, fish-
eries management, aquiculture production, and in-
formation availability in the seafood industry point
towards a suitable environment for the establish-
ment of seafood futures markets.
The two shrimp futures contracts include several
deliverable varieties. Shrimp varieties are usually
separated based on size, species, and origin. Par
white shrimp includes the species Penaeus van-
namei, P. occidentals, and P. stylirostris from the
western hemisphere, while the par black tiger
shrimp is comprised of P. monodon from Thailand,
the Philippines, and Indonesia.
In order to standardize the trade of shrimp
within each contract, premiums and discounts have
been introduced by the MGE for shrimp that devi-
ate from par size categories and species (MGE
1993; 1997a; 1997b). The par size category for the
black tiger shrimp futures contract is 21–25 (count
per pound) cpp, while the non-par categories per-
mitted for delivery are 16–20 and 26–30 cpp. The
different premiums determined by the MGE for
each non-par size category used in the analyses are
summarized in table 1. For the white shrimp fu-
tures contract, the par category is 41–50 cpp, The
non-par size categories accepted by the MGE are
31–35, 36-40, and 51–60 cpp. The premiums cor-
responding to these non-par size categories for the
white shrimp futures contract are summarized in
table 2. Premiums and discounts have already
changed twice for the white shrimp contract and
once for the black tiger contract (tables 1 and 2).
Part of the explanation for the poor performance
of the shrimp futures contracts may reside in high
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Table 1. Black Tiger Shrimp Futures
Non-Par Size Category Delivery Premiums
($/lb) Implemented in the Minneapolis
Grain Exchange




deliverable size category exchange option values,
which stem from volatility in the price differentials
between size categories (Martfnez-Garmendia and
Anderson 1999). In that study, a theoretical esti-
mation of the value of the options to exchange par
and non-par categories was carried out using the
Black and Scholes formula. The results suggest
that premiums/discounts are not able to eliminate
the changing price differentials between all deliv-
erable categories. However, a more intuitively di-
rect method for testing whether premium/discounts
are operating appropriately is to check whether the
relationship between par and non-par category
prices is one-to-one after adjusting for premiums/
discounts. The shrimp futures market’s ability to
unbiasedly predict spot prices for each size cat-
egory is also evaluated in this paper.
Data And Econometric Testing
Weekly cash prices for par and non-par shrimp size
categories (Urner-Barry Publications Inc. 1993–
1998) are used for the analyses. Cash prices for
black tigers are from the Los Angeles market,
while white shrimp cash prices are from the New
York City market. These two locations are par de-
livery points determined by the MGE. Futures
prices, however, correspond to closing quotes of
the contract closest to expiration, until the last Fri-
day before the expiration month. Cash and futures
price series are log transformed before the analyses
Table 2. White Shrimp Futures Non-Par
Size Category Delivery Premiums ($/lb)
Implemented in the Minneapolis
Grain Exchanfze
Size Category Sept 1993- Mar 1994- Starting
(Cpp) Dec 1993 Jul 1997 Aug 1997
31-35 1.05 0.40 0.35
36-40 0.45 0.15 0.10
41-50 — — —
51-60 -0.50 -0.65 -0.90
are carried out. For this study, 28 and 35 observa-
tions are used that correspond to the number of
contracts traded from September 1993 to August
1998 and from December 1994 to August 1998 for
white and black tiger shrimps, respectively. Figure
1 shows the price series for the time intervals stud-
ied,
The par size category for the black tiger shrimp
futures contract is 21–25 cpp, while the non-par
categories permitted for delivery are 16–20 and
26–30 cpp. All of them are P, tnonodon from Thai-
land, the Philippines, and Indonesia. For the white
shrimp futures contract, the MGE accepts as par
category 41–50 cpp and 31–35, 36-40, and 51–60
cpp shrimp as non-par categories. Par white shrimp
include P. vannamei, P. occidentals, and P. sfyli-
rostris from the western hemisphere. Prices for the
different non-par sizes are adjusted by the corre-
sponding premiums/discounts relative to the par
size categories.
Some individual economic time series tend to be
non-stationary and generally integrated of order
one, 1(1), When a unit root is present in a time-
series variable, it suggests that a shock in that vari-
able has a sustained effect, while if it is stationary,
the effect of the shocks tends to fade out through
time (Rao 1994). This condition results in non-
uniform variance of the disturbance term of the
time series throughout the stretch for which data is
available, which violates one of the five basic OLS
assumptions. In this paper, determination of
whether a variable is stationary or integrated of a
certain order, I(d), is carried out using the Phillips-
Perron test. The null hypothesis of this test is that
the variable is non-stationary.
The relationship between the par and non-par
size categories after adjusting for exogenous pre-
miums/discounts determined by the MGE can be
expressed by
(1) S~p=~O+alS~+et
where S*P is the spot price for the non-par size
category, and Sp is the spot price for the par cat-
egory. Ideally, efficient premiums/discounts
should lead to the joint parameter values restriction
cto = O andcxl = 1. Alternatively, the premiums/
discounts of a contract may not be able to eliminate
systematic arbitrage opportunities derived from
price deviations between par and non-par catego-
ries. If that is the case, the above joint restriction
would be statistically rejected. The variables asso-
ciated with this relationship are checked for non-
stationary behavior using the Phillips-Perron test.
The z-statistics of the Phillips-Perron test at the
levels and first differences are shown in table 3 for
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Figure 1. Futures Prices 30 Days Before and Spot Prices for the Black Tiger (a) and White
Shrimp (b) Deliverable Categories.
be interpreted to have a unit-root. Since the vari- method tends to provide different answers depend-
able involved show non-stationarity, cointegra- ing on the variable placed on the left-hand side of
tion techniques are used to estimate this relation- the cointegrating equation). The restriction thatao
ship. In this paper, the Johansen (1988) method is = O and al = 1 is tested using the Johansen test
followed because it allows for restriction tests, and statistic, which is a likelihood ratio test that com-
it is believed to be more reliable (i.e., the Granger pares restricted and unrestricted estimations (RaoMartinez -Garmendia and Anderson Premiums/Discounts and Predictive Abili~ofthe Shrimp Futures Market 163
Table 3. Phillips-Perron Test Statistics for
Unit Roots Results and the Length of the Lags































HO: the series is 1(1)
‘Rejection at 1%
bRejection at 5%
1994). The limiting distribution under the null hy-
pothesis is Chi-square, with the number of degrees
of freedom equal to the number of restrictions.
This is two in our case. Cointegration between par
and non-par size categories is tested using the Jo-
hansen cointegration procedure. Since Johansen’s
procedure is sensitive to the choice of length of the
VAR model (Hall 1991), we need to determine the
order of the model first. This is chosen according
to the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) statistic
by testing up to 5 VAR orders.
The ability of the shrimp futures market to pre-
dict unbiased spot prices for each size category is
also evaluated. The relationship between futures
and cash prices in commodities is traditionally de-
fined by
(2) S, = PO + ~1 F,.. + El
where S, is the spot price in period t and F~.. is the
futures price at time t-n (for n = 1,2, 3,4,5,6 and
7 weeks). Since we do not a priori know the period
in which traders operate based on most represen-
tative expectations about the spot market at the
time of expiration, a wide range was chosen for
testing. These tests are linked to the concept of
futures market efficiency, in that a well-behaved
futures market should use all available informa-
tion. Agent risk neutrality and a rational use of all
available information are common assumptions
underlying this model. Risk neutrality implies a
zero risk premium, while the efficient impounding
of all available, relevant information precludes un-
exploited arbitrage opportunities. If both parts of
the above joint hypothesis are confirmed, then the
current futures price serves as an unbiased predic-
tor of the future spot price. Acceptance of the joint
hypothesis that both assumptions hold implies that
the futures markets demonstrate pricing efficiency.
Rejection of one assumption, however, can lead to
the rejection of the joint hypothesis, but need not
necessarily imply market inefficiency. Rejection of
the joint hypothesis may suggest pricing ineffi-
ciency, risk aversion, or both (Antoniou and Foster
1994; Pizzi, Economopoulos and O’Neill 1998).
Given that we force the assumption of risk neutral-
ity, we limit the discussion to lack of futures mar-
ket bias rather than efficiency. Three tests are con-
sidered necessary to determine whether futures
markets are unbiased predictors of spot prices. The
first one states that spot and futures price series are
cointegrated. Some papers assume that this is proof
enough of an efficient, long-term relationship be-
tween spot and futures prices (Harris, McInish,
Shoesmith, and Wood 1995). The second is that in
the cointegrating regression the intercept should be
zero and the cointegrating vector should be equal
to one (i.e., (30 = O and ~, = l). Other studies
have assumed these two first conditions to be suf-
ficient for market efficiency testing (Crowder and
Hamed 1993; Lai and Lai 199 1). The third test for
an efficient market determines whether the coeffi-
cients on futures first differences and the error cor-
rection term in the error correction model (ECM)
are equal to one, and the coefficients on any lagged
spot returns are zero. Antoniou and Foster (1994)
suggest that while the first two conditions are nec-
essary for efficiency, sufficiency would only be
implied by showing that there are no important
deviations from the long-run equilibrium in the
short-term,
Results
The results associated with equation (1) for both
black tiger and white shrimps are summarized in
table 4. The number of cointegrating vectors is
determined using the trace test and the critical val-
ues provided by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1996).
The tests suggest that cash prices of 16-20 and
26–30 cpp black tiger shrimp size categories are
cointegrated with the 21–25 cpp par category. In
the case of the white shrimp, while the 3640 cpp
non-par category presents one cointegrating vector
with the 41–50 cpp par size category, the trace test
cannot reject the existence of zero cointegrating
vectors between the rest of the non-par size cat-
egories and the par size category. The a. = Oand
a, = 1 joint restriction test on the cointegrating
vector between the 36-40 cpp non-par category
and the par category, however, is rejected.
Cointegrating regressions for cash and futures
prices are also carried out to determine whether164 October 2001 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 4. Trace Tests Statistics with the VAR Order in Parentheses, Estimated Parameter
Values, And Restriction Tests for Equation (1)
Trace Test” Parameter Values Restriction
~=1 AIC e% al cq)=o, a,=l
Black tiger shrimp
16–20 Cpp 12,5602( 1)“ 115,0595
2630 Cpp 8,3126(1)’ 134.2395
White shrimp
31-35 Cpp 18,1335(3Y 96,0322 —
36+0 Cpp 8.1934(1) 108,4122 0.4378 0.81465 25.9720 [.000]
51–60 Cpp 14,3240( 1)“ 95.6407
“HO: at least r cointegrating vectors
‘Rejection at 5%
‘Rejection at 10%
futures prices are reliable predictors of cash prices. cointegrating vector is found for these two cases,
For black tiger shrimp (table 5), trace tests for the PO = O and ~, = 1 joint restriction of the
cointegration reject the existence of any long-term cointegrating equations tested does not hold. With
price relationship between the futures price and all regard to white shrimp (table 6), four combinations
size categories, with the exception of lags 1 and 7 of lags and size categories are found to have coin-
for the par size category 21–25 cpp. Although a tegrating relationships between cash and futures
Table 5. Trace Tests Statistics with the VAR Order in Parentheses, Estimated Parameter
Values, and Chi-squared Restriction Tests (with Significance Level in Brackets) in Equation (1)
for Black Tiger Shrimp
Trace Test”










































16–20 Cpp 11.783(1)’ 103.3873
21-25 Cpp 12.5086( 1)’ 120.7009
26–30 Cpp 11 .8974(l)b 123.6406
,$-2
16–20 Cpp 12.2783(l)b 105.5589
2 1–25 Cpp 14.7389(l)b 123.0519
26–30 Cpp 9.7372(1)’ 124.6958
x.,
16–20 Cpp 12.9366( 1)’ 107.661
21-25 Cpp 2.353(1) 123.5786 -0.068358 1.0583 17.4336 [.000]
26-30 Cpp 12.3561(1)” 126.2253
‘Ho: at least r cointegrating vectors
bRejection at 570Martinez -Garmendia and Anderson Premiums/Discounts and Predictive Ability of the Shrimp Futures Market 165
Table 6. Trace Tests Statistics with the VAR Order in Parentheses, Estimated Parameter
Values, and Chi-squared Restriction Tests (with Significance Level in Brackets) in Equation (1)
for White Shrimp
Trace Testa
r.=1 AIC PO P, X’(2)
h.,
31-35 Cpp 14.818(5)b 61.9728
36-40 Cpp 1.707(5] 80.84 -0.12711 1,2264 20.6643 [.000]
4 1–50 Cpp 17.3583(5)b 87.1052
51-60 Cpp 13.1913(5)’ 63,2698
L4
31-35 Cpp 14.7814(3)b 60.2231
36-40 Cptl 12.0771(3)b 73.4646
41-50 Cpp 14.0293(5)’ 79.0763





































































‘Ho: at least r cointegmting vectors
bRejection at 5%
“Rejection at 10%
prices. These are 36-40 cpp for 7 lags, 31–35 and
51–60 cpp for 3 lags, and 36-40 cpp for 2 lags.
However, the (30 = Oand (3, = 1joint restrictions
tested on these cointegrating equations do not lead
to chi-squared statistics that deem the null hypoth-
esis acceptable, as it was the case for the black
tiger shrimp.
The results indicate that shrimp futures markets
seem not to be able to predict cash prices for any
lag, size category, and shrimp type. Based on these
results, there is no need to test for the two other
necessary conditions—in the ECMS the coeffi-
cients on futures returns and the error correction
term should be equal to one, and the coefficients on
any lagged spot returns should be zero.
Conclusions
This paper tests the appropriateness of the use of
fixed premium/discounts in the black tiger and
white shrimp futures contracts. It also attempts to
test the futures market’s predictive ability. The re-
sults suggests that both tests lead to a negative
answer. However, even if these two contracts seem
not to be meeting expectations, it cannot be pre-
sumed that shrimp, and, by extension, other sea-
food commodities, are inherently unfeasible for fu-
tures market trading.
Cash prices of non-par deliverable shrimp size
categories for both contracts are tested for cointe-
gration with their respective par size category on a166 October 2001 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
pair-wise basis. Although in one case the prices for
non-par 36-40 cpp non-par and 41–50 cpp deliv-
erable size categories seem to have a long-term
relationship, the restriction test suggests that pre-
miums/discounts cannot eliminate opportunities
for arbitrage. Based on these results, the exchange
should consider a floating rather than fixed pre-
mitmddiscount system to homogenize the prices of
the different shrimp size categories included in the
contracts.
The second task of this paper is to determine
whether futures prices can unbiasedly predict cash
prices. Our analyses show that such is not the case
for either shrimp futures contract. None of the
tested lag times presents a consistent correlation
between futures and cash prices. This result is not
surprising considering the poor trading volume as-
sociated with these two contracts through-out the
entire trading periods,
This paper demonstrates the lack of effective-
ness of premiums/discounts to eliminate cash price
differentials, and therefore, arbitrage opportunities.
At the initial stages of the contracts, these arbitrage
opportunities may have discouraged many traders
in two possible ways. First, traders expecting de-
liveries probably received several non-par size cat-
egories. Also, the existence of short-term arbitrage
opportunities within a futures contract usually re-
sults in loss of hedging effectiveness of the con-
tract. Therefore, even traders who offset their po-
sitions before delivery did not see the potential
benefits of futures contracts to manage risk. This
early loss of interest in the contracts produced poor
trade volume, which explains the poor predictive
ability of the contracts,
The lack of success of the two shrimp contracts
could persuade exchanges not to offer more futures
contracts for seafood products in the future. Un-
fortunately, this industry could benefit from mar-
ket-based risk management mechanisms such as
derivative markets. The seafood economy world-
wide is highly regulated by governmental fishery
resource management, and in some countries by
price support systems and trade barriers. The ex-
istence of successful seafood futures contracts
could help liberalize markets and improve the abil-
ity of the industry to manage risk. We believe that
a greater homogeneity of seafood products could,
in fact, lead to successful seafood futures contracts.
The increasing relevance of aquiculture as a con-
trolled production system relative to more uncer-
tain supply from wild captures could eventually
become a critical, positive factor for the success of
seafood futures contracts.
The other major challenge for seafood futures
contracts is that seafood cash markets are charac-
terized by a significant lack of transparency. This
is also bound to change due to the opening of web-
sites specialized in electronic seafood trading. Pub-
lic bids/asks on a global and continuous scale
could become a big step towards greater seafood
spot market transparency.
Finally, details on seafood production are rarely
unveiled by timely data on landings or expected
crops, This is relevant information that will influ-
ence future cash prices and current futures prices.
In its absence, however, it cannot be efficiently
incorporated by traders into their decisions to buy
and sell futures contracts. Timely governmental
and private reports on production and market out-
look could help to create expectations that can be
channeled into futures price formation. In fact, a
greater number of sources and more sophisticated
analyses are becoming available, especially since
the inception of internet-based electronic markets.
Therefore, although seafood futures markets
have had a discouraging start with the shrimp fu-
tures contracts on the MGE, there are signs for
optimism. The advent of aquiculture and the inter-
net could revolutionize the way seafood is traded.
As a result, the seafood industry is evolving to-
wards product and information supply, as well as
spot market characteristics favorable for futures
contract trading.
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